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Fault diagnosis for nonlinear aircraft based on control-induced redundancy
Julien Marzat, He´le`ne Piet-Lahanier, Fre´de´ric Damongeot, E´ric Walter
Abstract— A Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) method
for a generic 3D aircraft is presented. The behavior of the
aircraft is described by a nonlinear control-affine model, which
is closed-loop controlled by a classical guidance, navigation
and control (GNC) algorithm. The proposed FDI procedure
exploits the redundancy induced by this control module, along
with the accelerations measured by the Inertial Measurement
Unit (IMU). Estimates of first-order derivatives of some state
variables are thus readily available and allow one to estimate
the control inputs as achieved by the actuators. Since the
computed control input sent to the actuator is known, it is
possible to use the discrepancy between these two elements as a
residual indicative of faults. This strategy is successfully applied
to the proposed aeronautical benchmark to detect and isolate
actuator faults affecting simultaneously flight control surfaces
and propulsion.
Index Terms— aerospace, aircraft, fault detection and isola-
tion, fault diagnosis, nonlinear systems, system inversion.
I. INTRODUCTION
A reliability study [1] reports that about 80% of flight
incidents concerning Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are
due to faults affecting propulsion, flight control surfaces or
sensors. To allow the mission to carry on and to insure
its safety, these faults should be detected early, before they
lead to catastrophic failures. A classical way to tackle this
problem is to use hardware redundancy, i.e., multiple de-
vices performing the same function. However, this approach
implies higher costs, lower autonomy and reduced payload,
because of the additional weight, volume and power required.
An interesting way to circumvent these difficulties is to
rely on analytical redundancy, which exploits the relations
between measured or estimated variables to detect possible
dysfunctions of the system [2], [3].
The main FDI approaches, coming from different com-
munities, are reviewed in [4], where the most promising
methods for aeronautical systems are pointed out. Most
model-based methods use a linear dynamical model of the
aircraft (see, e.g., [5] or [6]). In aerospace, though, nonlinear
models provide a more accurate representation of the vehicle
complex behavior [7]. The immediate idea would be to
linearize the model in order to be able to apply the familiar
linear techniques, but the inaccuracy thus generated increases
drastically non-detection and false-alarm rates [8]. Therefore,
dedicated nonlinear methods should be investigated.
An interesting breakthrough has been achieved in
a differential-geometric framework by De Persis and
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Isidori [9]. This method extends the parity space ap-
proach [10] to nonlinear control-affine systems. It has been
successfully applied to a two-dimensional aircraft model
in [11]. Most FDI methods, including the latter, check
whether the outputs of the system monitored are consistent
with the inputs, given the model. Another interesting idea
is inversion-based FDI, which uses the left-inverse of the
nonlinear system (defined as in [12]) to check whether the ex-
pected inputs are consistent with the measured outputs [13].
However, all these approaches require the computation of
successive derivatives of noisy and disturbed inputs and
outputs (which can be numerically tricky), or model trans-
formations that lack generality.
Aircraft are most often equipped with an Inertial Measure-
ment Unit (IMU) that measures non-gravitational accelera-
tions and angular rates. These quantities are then integrated
by an Inertial Navigation System (INS) to estimate the entire
state vector. They are derivatives of the velocity variables that
are in the state vector. Building a left-inverse model through
successive derivations of differential equations can thus be
avoided. We propose to perform a direct inversion to estimate
the achieved control inputs from available information. It
is similar in spirit to that in [14], where acceleration is
estimated instead. As the desired control inputs are known,
consistency may then be checked between the estimated and
expected control values.
This approach is illustrated on an aeronautical benchmark
defined in [4], which is representative of a large panel of
aerospace vehicles. The aircraft considered is equipped with
classical, non-redundant sensors and actuators. Its three-
dimensional behavior is represented by a nonlinear control-
affine model described in Section II.
The practical application of the proposed FDI approach to
this aeronautical benchmark is the focal point of this paper.
A formal description of the method is available in [15]. The
preliminary analytical computation is explained in Section III
and simulation results are displayed in Section IV. They
show that the fault diagnosis approach allows the detection,
isolation and even identification of multiple actuator faults.
Conclusions and perspectives are discussed in Section V.
II. AERONAUTICAL BENCHMARK
The vehicle considered is a surface-to-air missile on an
interception mission. It is equipped with an IMU, coupled
with an INS. The orientation of the vehicle is governed by
three rudders, one per axis. The propulsion is regulated along
the main axis of the missile, which is assumed cylindrical.
The geometry of the aircraft in its body frame is displayed
in Figure 1. These features are not specific to the case study
and are shared by other applications, such as an UAV on an
exploration mission. The description of the flight dynamics
is stated below.
Fig. 1. Missile scheme in body frame
A. Notation
• I = diag(a, b, b) is the inertia matrix of the system,
• [x, y, z] is the position in the inertial frame,
• [vbx, vby, vbz] is the speed in body coordinates,
• [abx, aby, abz] is the non-gravitational acceleration in
body coordinates,
• [ϕ, θ, ψ] is the orientation of the vehicle,
• [p, q, r] is the angular velocity,
• [δl, δm, δn] are the rudder deflection angles,
• η is the propulsion rate,
• Q = 12ρ
(
v2bx + v
2
by + v
2
bz
)
is the dynamic pressure,
• α = arctan
(
vbz
vbx
)
is the angle of attack,
• β = arctan
(
vby
vbx
)
is the sideslip angle,
• m is the aircraft mass,
• fmin and fmax are constants of the propulsion model,
• sref and lref are the reference surface and length,
• c(.) are the aerodynamic coefficients, known piecewise
continuous nonlinear functions of (α, β).
B. Dynamics
The force equation is[
abx
aby
abz
]
=
[
v˙bx
v˙by
v˙bz
]
+
[
p
q
r
]
∧
[
vbx
vby
vbz
]
=
1
m
(faero + fg) (1)
where
faero = Qsref
[
− (cx0 + cxαα+ cxδlδl + cxδmδm + cxδnδn)
cy0 + cyββ + cyδlδl + cyδnδn
− (cz0 + czαα+ czδmδm)
]
+
[
fmin + (fmax − fmin) η
0
0
]
fg =
[
− sin(θ)mg
cos(θ) sin(ϕ)mg
cos(θ) cos(ϕ)mg
]
Since the inertia matrix is diagonal, the momentum equation
is {
p˙ = QsrefL
a
q˙ = 1
b
[QsrefM − (a− b)pr]
r˙ = 1
b
[QsrefN − (b− a)pq]
(2)
where
L = cl0 + clββ + clδlδl + clδnδn +
lref√
v2
bx
+v2
by
+v2
bz
clpp
M = cm0 + cmαα+ cmδmδm +
lref√
v2
bx
+v2
by
+v2
bz
cmqq
N = cn0 + cnββ + cnδlδl + cnδnδn +
lref√
v2
bx
+v2
by
+v2
bz
cnrr
The angular dynamics is[
ϕ˙
θ˙
ψ˙
]
=
[
1 sinϕ tan θ cosϕ tan θ
0 cosϕ − sinϕ
0 sinϕ
cos θ
cosϕ
cos θ
][
p
q
r
]
(3)
The model description should be completed with the coor-
dinate transformation from the body frame to the inertial
frame,[
x˙
y˙
z˙
]
=
[
cosψ cos θ Rb1 Rb2
sinψ cos θ Rb3 Rb4
− sin θ cos θ sinϕ cos θ cosϕ
][
vbx
vby
vbz
]
(4)
where
Rb1 = − sinψ cosϕ+ cosψ sin θ sinϕ
Rb2 = sinψ sinϕ+ cosψ sin θ cosϕ
Rb3 = cosψ cosϕ+ sinψ sin θ sinϕ
Rb4 = − cosψ sinϕ+ sinψ sin θ cosϕ
The state vector is x = [x, y, z, vbx, vby, vbz, p, q, r, ϕ, θ, ψ]
T
and the input vector is u = [δl, δm, δn, η, ]
T. This com-
plete control-affine nonlinear model has 12 state vari-
ables, which is highly classical in aerospace models. The
complete model structure is obtained by gathering equa-
tions (1), (2), (3) and (4).
C. Sensors and Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC)
The IMU measures the non-gravitational acceleration
and angular velocity. The INS integrates these ele-
ments to estimate the position, velocity and orienta-
tion of the vehicle. The resulting output vector is
y = [abx, aby, abz, p, q, r, x, y, z, vbx, vby, vbz, ϕ, θ, ψ]
T. Er-
rors affecting the measurements are usually modeled as bi-
ases, scale factors and noise. For example, the measurement
of the yaw rate r is expressed as r˜ = krr+br+wr where kr
is the scale factor, br the bias and wr follows a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σr. These three
parameters (for each sensor) are characteristic of the IMU
and set in the simulated test case at typical values.
An interception guidance law is designed to drive the
distance between missile and target to zero. The upper part
of Figure 2 shows the guidance architecture, which is a
closed-loop control using exogenous target information. The
classical approach separately defines the guidance law and
an autopilot that translates acceleration orders in actuator
rotations. Further details concerning the GNC theory used in
the benchmark can be found in [16].
D. Faults
We need to distinguish two types of control input vectors.
• The (known) control input vector as computed by the
GNC module, uc = [δlc, δmc, δnc, ηc]
T.
• The (unknown) control input vector as achieved by the
actuators, ua = [δla, δma, δna, ηa]
T.
Sensor faults may be modeled as unexpected variations in
the uncertainty parameters of the IMU. We focus here on
actuator faults, which result in discrepancies between uc
and ua. This means that the control input sent by the
GNC module is not correctly implemented by the actuator.
Actuators faults will be modeled as
ua = σf · kf · uc + (1− σf) · uf
where ∀t > tfault, depending on the type of fault occurring,
and where the parameters are such that
σf = 1, kf = 1 (no fault)
σf = 1, 0 < kf < 1 (loss of effectiveness)
σf = 0, kf = 1, uf = uc(tfault) (locking in place)
This fault model will be used to simulate two major faults
affecting actuators, namely the loss of effectiveness of the
propulsion and the locking in place of one rudder (or more).
III. FAULT DIAGNOSIS
A. Principles
The key idea is to use the control-affine structure of the
system and the available measurements to extract directly an
estimate of the achieved control input vector, without com-
puting an inverse state-space model. Let ûa be this estimate
of ua. Fault residuals are then obtained by comparing ûa
with uc. The complete architecture of the system coupled
with the fault diagnosis procedure is displayed in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Vehicle loop and residual generation
Many inversion procedures can be considered. We now
present a possible approach to obtain expressions of ûa that
will lead to reliable fault detection, isolation and identifica-
tion.
The first step is to select, from the entire state-space model
described in Section II-B, state equations where the control
inputs are the only unknown variables. In other words, these
equations must contain only measured (or reliably estimated)
state variables and their derivatives, and control inputs. The
only group of equations fulfilling this requirements is that
of the force equations (1). Indeed, there is no control input
present in (3) and (4), so these equations are useless for the
proposed FDI method. Equations of (2) are also excluded,
because the variables p˙, q˙, r˙ are not measured. For fault
diagnosis, we thus consider only the force equation, whose
only non-measured variables are the control inputs, which
appear in an affine manner
abx = −
Qsref
m
[cx0 + cxaα+ cxδlδl + cxδmδm + cxδnδn]
+ 1
m
[fmin + (fmax − fmin) η]
aby =
Qsref
m
[cy0 + cybβ + cyδlδl + cyδnδn]
abz =
Qsref
m
[cz0 + czaα+ czδmδm]
It could be formalized as f = Gu, or more explicitly f1f2
f3
 =
 g11 g12 g13 g14g21 0 g23 0
0 g32 0 0


δl
δm
δn
η
 (5)
where 
f1 = abx +
Qsref
m
[cx0 + cxaα]−
fmin
m
f2 = aby −
Qsref
m
[cy0 + cybβ]
f3 = abz +
Qsref
m
[cz0 + czaα]
g11 = −
Qsrefcxδl
m
g12 = −
Qsrefcxδm
m
g13 = −
Qsrefcxδn
m
g14 =
fmax−fmin
m
g21 = −
Qsrefcyδl
m
g23 = −
Qsrefcyδn
m
g32 = −
Qsrefczδm
m
Note that these coefficients are all functions of the measure-
ment vector y, however this dependency will be omitted in
what follows for the sake of simplicity.
B. Direct residuals
The idea of the estimation procedure is to consider sep-
arately each equation in (5). Using one of these equations,
each control input involved can be estimated as a function of
the measurements and the other control inputs. Substituting
the computed values for the unknown values of the other
inputs gives an estimate of this control input as achieved by
the corresponding actuator. This direct procedure produces
as many residuals as there are nonzero terms in G (seven
here).
Consider, for example, the second equation f2 = g21δl +
g23δn. It is possible to obtain estimates of δla and δna (roll
and yaw angles achieved by the corresponding rudders) as
δ̂la =
f2 − g23δnc
g21
(6)
and
δ̂na =
f2 − g21δlc
g23
(7)
These estimates are valid only when the corresponding
denominators are nonzero. They are structurally so, but their
value should nevertheless be checked and the residual not
taken into account if the denominator is too close to zero.
Residuals can now be generated by comparing the values
obtained through (6) and (7) to the computed control inputs
δlc and δnc, provided by the control module, to get the
residuals
r21 = δ̂la − δlc =
f2 − g23δnc
g21
− δlc (8)
and
r23 = δ̂na − δnc =
f2 − g21δlc
g23
− δnc
Five other residuals are obtained similarly from the first and
third equations of (5).
C. Sensitivity and robustness
The sensitivity of the residuals to actuator faults should be
analyzed, to ensure the possibility of isolation when multiple
faults occur. If we consider the previously generated residual
r21 and replace f2 by its expression from (5), we have
r21 =
g21δla + g23δna − g23δnc
g21
− δlc
= (δla − δlc) +
g23
g21
(δna − δnc) (9)
Therefore, if a fault affecting the roll rudder δl occurs and
if there is no fault affecting the yaw rudder δn (i.e., δna =
δnc), then the residual r21 measures the distance between δla
and δlc and directly identifies the error of angle affecting the
roll rudder. On the other hand, if there is no fault affecting δl
and if a fault affecting δn occurs, the residual will react to it
but will not allow a direct identification of the fault because
of the factor involved in (9). The fault on δn, if isolated, can
nevertheless be identified by multiplying r21 by g21/g23. The
residual r23 has the opposite features. This analysis makes
it possible to fill in the first seven rows of Table I.
To get an idea of the robustness of the method to
model uncertainty, let the actual equation for f2 in (5) be
f2 = (g21 + ε1) δl + (g23 + ε2) δn, where ε1 and ε2 are
small parameters (not necessarily constant). This represents
model uncertainty on constant parameters (e.g., mass) and
aerodynamic coefficients c(·), which are partially unknown
in practice. Injecting this expression for f2 in (8) yields
r21 =
(g21 + ε1) δla + (g23 + ε2) δna − g23δnc
g21
− δlc
= (δla − δlc) +
g23
g21
(δna − δnc) +
1
g21
(ε1δla + ε2δna)
= (δla − δlc) +
g23
g21
(δna − δnc) + ∆ (ε1, ε2,ua,y)
The residual is still sensitive to the two faults on δl and δn as
explained in the sensitivity analysis, however an additional
term ∆(·) has appeared, in which
• ε1 and ε2 are small parameters. A bound on their value
may be known or assumed;
• δla and δna are the unknown but bounded (due to
physical saturation) control inputs as achieved by the
actuators;
• the g(·)s are known functions of the measurements.
The available information on these variables implies that
upper and lower bounds on ∆(·) are computable at each
time step. If ε1 and ε2 are small enough, ∆ should remain
smaller than the size of the fault that needs to be detected and
isolated. Nevertheless, identification of the numerical value
of the fault in such conditions should be carried out with
care. The same type of dependency to model uncertainty is
observed with observer-based or parity space approaches as
described, e.g., in [3] or in [17].
D. Additional residuals
The residuals obtained so far are functions of the available
measurements and computed control inputs. Others may be
obtained by substitution.
1) First substitution: The second equation in (5) contains
only one control input, δm. It is then possible to obtain
an estimator of this control input as a function of the
measurements only,
δ̂m =
f3
g32
(10)
This expression can be injected into the residuals in place
of the computed control input δmc. Consider, for example,
the residual
r11 =
f1 − g12δmc − g13δnc − g14ηc
g11
− δlc (11)
and substitute δ̂m as given by (10) for δmc to get the
alternative residual
r˜111 =
f1 − g12
f3
g32
− g13δnc − g14ηc
g11
− δlc
As shown in Section III-C, sensitivity to a given actuator
fault is indicated by the presence of the corresponding
computed control input in the residual. Here, r11 is sensitive
to faults affecting all the actuators while r˜111 is insensitive
to faults on δm. Four such residuals are obtained from the
first equation of (5), and their sensitivity was analyzed as in
Section III-C to complete Table I.
2) Second and third substitution: The second equation of
(5) makes it possible to express δl as a function of δn and
the measurements and reciprocally δn as a function of δl and
the measurements, to get
δ̂l =
f2 − g23δnc
g21
(12)
and
δ̂n =
f2 − g21δlc
g23
(13)
Substituting δ̂l as given by (12) for δlc in (11), one obtains
the new residual
r˜211 =
f1 − g12δmc − g13δnc − g14ηc
g11
−
f2 − g23δnc
g21
=
f1 − g12δmc − g14ηc
g11
−
f2
g21
−
(
g13
g11
−
g23
g21
)
δnc
To analyze the sensitivity of this new residual, f1 and f2
are replaced by their expression from (5) to get
r˜211 =
g12
g11
( δma − δmc) +
g14
g11
( ηa − ηc)
+
(
g13
g11
−
g23
g21
)
( δna − δnc)
This residual is thus insensitive to δl, which allows fault
isolation between δl and δn. However, no direct fault identi-
fication is possible due to the functions involved. The other
residuals r˜212, r˜
2
13, r˜
2
14 will be sensitive to the same actuator
faults but may allow further fault identification.
The same kind of substitution can be made with (13),
producing one additional residual r˜311 that will be sensitive to
faults affecting δl, δm and η but not δn. Three other residuals
could be obtained and will present sensitivity to the same
actuator faults.
3) Fourth and fifth substitution: It is even possible to go
further. As earlier, δmc can be replaced by the estimate (10)
in the residuals generated in the previous paragraph, which
produces residuals r˜411, which is sensitive to faults affecting
only δn and η, and r˜
5
11, which is sensitive to faults affecting
only δl and η. Table I sums up the sensitivity of all these
residuals to the actuator faults.
TABLE I
FAULT SIGNATURES
δl δm δn η
r11 1 1 1 1
r12 1 1 1 1
r13 1 1 1 1
r14 1 1 1 1
r21 1 0 1 0
r23 1 0 1 0
r32 0 1 0 0
r˜111 1 0 1 1
r˜211 0 1 1 1
r˜311 1 1 0 1
r˜411 0 0 1 1
r˜511 1 0 0 1
Notice that the fault signature (the Boolean column) of
each actuator in Table I is unique. This means that fault
detection and isolation is possible even when multiple faults
occur successively or simultaneously. It has also been shown
that fault identification may be possible if only one fault to
whom the residual is sensitive occurs at a time.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The aeronautical benchmark (cf. Section II) is simulated
with a time step of 0.01s. Uncertainty parameters affecting
IMU measurements are tuned to typical values, as mentioned
in Section II-C. The IMU is also assumed to suffer a delay of
two time steps. Three fault scenarios are defined, a selection
of residuals being displayed for each of them (cf. Table II).
The corresponding 3D trajectories are presented in Figure 3.
TABLE II
FAULT SCENARIOS
Scenario Faults Residuals displayed
1 loss of 25% of η at 30s r14, r12, r23
2
{
δm locked at 30s
loss of 25% of η at 50s
r32, r21, r˜
1
14
3
{
loss of 50% of η at 20s
δm locked at 45s
δn locked at 30s
r23, r32, r˜
4
11, r˜
5
14
Fig. 3. Failed-interception trajectories
A. Scenario 1 (see Figure 4)
The 25 % propulsion loss is identifiable with r14. The
residual r12 allows the detection of the fault but is not tuned
to identify it, while r23 is insensitive to it. This abrupt fault
can be detected with a very short delay.
Fig. 4. Scenario 1
B. Scenario 2 (see Figure 5)
The residuals r32 and r˜
1
14 respectively allow the detection
and identification of faults on δm and η. The residual r21 is
insensitive to both faults, ensuring isolation with respect to
faults on the two other actuators. The incipient character of
the fault affecting δm will imply a delay in its detection and
identification.
Fig. 5. Scenario 2
C. Scenario 3 (see Figure 6)
The residuals r23, r32 and r˜
5
14 are respectively sensitive to
faults on δn, δm and η. The residual r˜
4
11 reacts to both faults
on propulsion and the yaw rudder.
Fig. 6. Scenario 3
Note that, through this FDI procedure, the detection,
isolation and identification of faults affecting three actuators
(out of four) simultaneously is feasible, using only the three
force equations.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
This paper was dedicated to the application to an aero-
nautical test-case of the nonlinear diagnosis method that has
been formally presented in [15]. The major assumptions are
that the behavior of the system can be reliably represented
by a nonlinear control-affine model, and that an IMU (or
any other device measuring acceleration) is available. If these
assumptions are valid, then the force equation can be used to
compute fault residuals. An inversion procedure to extract the
achieved control inputs from this model has been presented.
Residuals are obtained by comparing the estimates of the
control inputs achieved by the actuators with the computed
ones provided by the control module. Substitutions are then
carried out to eliminate control inputs from the residuals.
Fault detection and isolation of multiple faults affecting all
the actuators has been shown to be feasible on the generic
six-degrees-of-freedom aeronautical benchmark proposed, in
the presence of realistic measurement uncertainty.
This paper was focused on the description of the resid-
ual generation procedure, and the residual analysis strategy
remains to be chosen. Statistical tests and adaptive thresh-
olds are interesting contenders. Sensor faults and robustness
regarding disturbances (such as wind) should also be ad-
dressed.
Finally, the proposed method should be analyzed with
respect to performance indices such as non-detection and
false-alarm rates, detection delays and computational com-
plexity. A framework to conduct as objectively as possible
this rating and comparison with other FDI approaches should
be designed.
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